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SUMMARY
One principal feature sets state and local government securities
apart from other capital market obligations: exemption of the in.
terest return from the income taxation of the federal government,
and usually exemption from income taxation by the state of
As a result most of the state and local government securities pri-
vately held are held by persons or institutions which are subject
to high federal income taxation. As would be expected, few are
held by institutional investors which are tax-exempt as such. Indi-
viduals are the most important holders; later in this chapter we
shall review evidence suggesting that most of the state and local
government securities held by individuals are owned by upper-in-
come bracket investors—as would be expected. Commercial banks
are the most important institutional investors; they are subject to
corporate income taxes at the standard rates. Fire and casualty
insurance companies are next in size of holding. Both types of com-
panies in this field pay the standard corporate tax rate on marginal
investment income with certain exceptions.2 Life insurance compa-
nies are the only important investing institutions which buy state
and local government obligations in appreciable volume though
partly sheltered from federal income taxes. Life insurance compa-
nies are taxed according to a quite special formula. While life in-
surance companies enjoy only moderate tax advantages from own-
ing tax-exempt securities at present, they may consider themselves
prudent to hold some tax exempts as a protection against the pos-
1Itis frequently forgotten that interest income from state and local govern-
ment obligations is quite generally taxed fully by states themselves in states
other than that of issue. In 1952, 31 of the 34 states having a corporate income
tax taxed the income from securities issued by other states; 16 taxed the income
from the obligations of the home states. In the same year 30 of the 33 states
having a personal income tax taxed the income from securities issued by public
bodies in other states; 8 taxed those of the home state.
2Underthe Revenue Code of 1954, certain mutual insurance companies pay
a normal tax of 25 per cent rather than the usual 30 per cent and accordingly,
when the 22 per cent surtax is allowed for, have a marginal tax rate of 47 per
cent rather than 52 per cent.
67THE SUPPLY OF FUNDS BY INVESTORS
sibility of future changes in tax laws. Since many toll road and
other revenue bonds yield about as much as could be secured on
fully taxed securities, they have the opportunity to store up a reserve
of tax exemption for the future without suffering impairment of
income in the present. A mild revival of mutual savings bank in-
terest in these securities seems to have started after 1951 when the
tax laws were changed so that some mutual savings banks became
subject to corporate income taxation. The only group of investors—
other than state and local governments themselves—clearly free of
income tax liabilities are the fraternal societies. Their holdings
have dropped from a small to a smaller part of the total amount
privately held. State and local governments themselves are impor-
tant investors in their own securities. Their holdings are material
and they are sometimes important market factors, but the incentive
lying back of this is generally a parochial one.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the investment prac-
tices and policies of each of the principal investors in state and
local government obligations: why they buy them, their policies
with respect to maturity and quality, and the alternative uses of
funds that each type of investor might make. This examination is
necessary because each of the principal classes of investors has a
quite different investment problem. Consequently, the timing of
their purchases has varied greatly. In some periods individuals have
dominated the market; in others, banks have taken the leading role
and casualty insurance companies have also been increasingly im-
portant. The participation of life insurance companies has been quite
irregular.
No other market seems to have experienced such pronounced and
frequent changes in customers. The sharp fluctuations in the secu-
rities absorbed by the various groups are shown in Table 8. This
table is limited to "private" acquisitions. No group shows a really
stable record; the nearest approach to stability is found in the rec-
ord of fire and casualty companies. The participation of commer-
cial banks is shown to have varied from as little as 3 per cent to
as much as 63 per cent of net increases in private holdings.
It is quite likely that the sharp and frequent shifting in the
participation of various investors in the market for state and local






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.THE SUPPLY OF FUNDS BY INVESTORS
in Chapter 6. The "offering for state and local government
securities which are presented in that chapter vary in slope and
shape from the yield curves of either corporate bonds or Treasury
securities because of the shifting composition of the market. The
greater range of price fluctuation for state and local government
securities, noted in Chapter 6, is probably related to this market
characteristic. After this examination of the position of the various
groups of investors, the chapter will conclude with some general-
izing comments.
THE MARKET FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
OBLIGATIONS AMONG INDIVIDUALS
At the opening off the postwar decade, individuals held slightly
more than 60 per cent of the state and local government obliga-
tions privately owned. By mid-1952 this fraction had been reduced
to about 45 per cent. But at the end of the decade this fraction
was starting once more to rise. Of the net increase in privately
held state and local government obligations during the postwar
decade, about 35 per cent was absorbed by individuals. This story
may be read from Table 9•4 Even more notable is the evident fact
that individual acquisitions have varied greatly from year to year.
Individual holdings declined through the end of 1946. In 1947, how-
ever, individuals increased their purchases sufficiently to account
for three-eighths of the net gain in 1947. In 1948 they accounted
for more than half. In the three years, 1949 through 1951, indi-
viduals acquired only about a quarter of the gain in private hold-
ings. In 1952 and even more in 1953, with sharply higher interest
rates, individuals accounted for almost four-ninths of the increase
in private holdings. This proportion fell to about one-fifth in 1954
when money markets were eased and banks bid prices up. When
money market conditions were reversed in 1955 and 1956, indi-
viduals again became the dominant factor in the market, account-
ing for five-sixths of the increase in private holdings.
This evidence suggests that participation in this market by mdi-
8Fora definition, see Chapter 4.
4Thistable should be interpreted with considerable care. As explained in
Appendix A,Column1 is derived as a residual from other figures more directly
reported. Although the results should be reasonably accurate, they are subject
to some systematic biases such as the reporting of holdings on a book-value
rather than a par-value basis.
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TABLE 9





Total as a Proportion of
Privately Annual Change in Total
YearAmountHeld Change in Privately Held
End Held(per cent)Amount Held (per cent)
• (2') (2) (3) (4)
1945 9,559 61.3 a
1946 9,316 59.4 —243 (neg.)
1947 9,814 57.5 498 35.5
1948 10,872 56.7 1,058 50.7
1949 11,522 54.3 650 31.7
1950 12,072 50.5 550 20.3
1951 12,502 48.2 430 21.6
1952 13,645 47.8 1,143 44.7
1953 15,459 47.9 1,814 48.4
1954 16,253 44.3 794 18.0
1955 18,001 45.0 1,748 52.5
1956 19,752 45.8 1,751 59.0
a Totalamount privately held declined.
Source: Col. I: Table A-3, col. 10; Cal. 2: Table A.4, col. 10; CoIs.
8 and 4: computed from Table A-3.
viduals has had a jerky quality; in some years they have been the
leading buyers, in others they have dropped back in rank. The
principal effort of this section will be to appraise various purported
explanations of this irregularity in individual participation.
The individuals who own state and local government securities
are primarily those with higher incomes; presumption and logic
support this fact. But in order to appraise the size and character
of this market, we need reasonably precise answers to such ques-
tions as: At what level of income do such holdings become a sig-
nificant part of portfolios? What are the investment alternatives
open to those who can advantageously invest in tax-exempt securi-
ties? What is the nature of income and saving at the level of in-
come or among the groups that purchase tax-exempt securities?
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For example, is proprietary income important in accounting for
this demand? If so, the irregularity of proprietary income might
account for the irregularity of individual demand. A knowledge
of the relationship between wealth and income at the upper levels
of each would help to mark out the margins of this market. Those
who have high incomes but little wealth seldom start to build a
portfolio by buying tax-exempt securities. Those of considerable
wealth but mcsdest income (nonincome producing wealth can ac-
count for such a case) have little reason to seek tax exemption
of income. A man of wealth who is aggressively pushing the de-
velopment of his own business might have little to spare for in-
vestment in tax-exempt form.
As might be expected, our knowledge of these various points
is fragmentary. The fragments yield some interesting conclusions,
but they fall short of telling the full story. Of necessity, our review
of this evidence will have something of the episodic nature that
marks its origins. The principal sources consulted and used in this
part of the inquiry include:
1. Lent's study5 of tax-exempt security ownership includes an
examination of the concentration of individual ownership by size
of income and also by concentration of such ownership in estates
by size of estate. Lent also directed some attention to the problem
of income concentrated in upper-income shares. He found that two-
thirds of the state and local government securities held by indi-
viduals in 1940 were held by the upper one per cent income group.6
2. Atkinson's study7 of financial asset ownership includes esti-
mates of the income received from tax-exempt obligations and of
the principal value of these obligations in the sample of tax re-
turns covered by this study.
Atkinson's 1949 sample of Wisconsin taxpayers showed that those
having an income of $50,000 or more held 2.3 per cent of their
financial assets in state and local government securities. The hold-
ings of such securities in this income group accounted for 38 per
cent of the total of such securities, the holdings of which were
implied by the tax returns.
5GeorgeE. Lent, The Ownership of Tax-Exempt Securities, 1913-1953, Occa-
sional Paper 47, National Bureau, 1955.
6Ibid.,p. 116.
7ThomasR. Atkinson, The Pattern of Financial Asset Ownership: Wisconsin
Individuals, 1949(PrincetonUniversity Press for National Bureau, 1956).
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Those having an income of $25,000 to $50,000 held 1.2 per cent
of their financial assets in state and local obligations and accounted
for 22 per cent of total implied holdings.
Those with incomes of less than $25,000 held less than one-half
of 1 per cent of their financial assets in state and local govern-
ment securities but nevertheless accounted for 40 perU cent of the
total holdings implied. In this income range, there is no further
evidence that the proportion of state and local government secu-
rities held is related to size of income; except for the• very smallest
income size group the others held close to one-half of 1 per cent
of their financial assets in this form.
3. Mendershausen estimated the amounts of financial assets held
by living persons.8 This estimate was based on the estate tax re-
turns for the year 1944. Mendershausen estimated that 90 per cent
or more of the state and local government securities held by indj-
viduals in 1944 were held by individuals who would have been
required to file an estate tax return if they had died in that year.
Comparison with an earlier study by C. 0. Hardy based on similar
data suggests that the degree of concentration in ownership had
increased from the 1920's to 1944. Robert Lampman has carried
the Mendershausen: estimates forward in an unpublished National
Bureau study but..his material was not ready for use in time for
inclusion in this study.
4. A Harvard team studied, by intensive interview, the invest-
ment preferences and policies of about 750 wealthy.
in1949. Butters-Thompson-Bollinger
found the proportion of and local government securities in
the 1949 portfolios of those interviewed to be (Table A-13, p. 468):
Income Per cent of Wealth Per cent of
(thOusands of $) Portfolio (thousands of $) Portfolio
Under -$7.5 *
. Under-$25
7.5 to12.5 1 25 to 50. *
12.5 to25.0 2 50 to 100 1
25.0 to50.0 2 100 to 250: 1
50.0 to100.0 4 250 to500 2
100.0 and over 7 500 to1,000 .
1,000and over 5
* Less than one-half of one per cent.
8 Goldsmith, Study of Saving, Vol. in, p. 361.
9 J. Keith Butters, Lawrence E. Thompson, and Lynn L. BOllinger, Effects of
Taxation: Investments by Individuals (Harvard Business School, 1.53).
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These findings confirm the major point that holdings of tax-
exempt state and local government securities are concentrated
among those with high incomes and usually considerable wealth.
But they also show that such holdings are not confined to upper
income groups. Furthermore the various studies tend to confirm
one another, though minor differences may be found. Lent con-
cluded that two-thirds of such individual holdings are to be found
in the upper 1 per cent of the income The pattern of Wis-
consin holdings estimated by Atkinson suggested a slightly lower
degree of concentration. The two do not necessarily conflict; Wis-
consin experience might differ from the national average. Mender-
evidence suggested that in the year 1944 most tax-exempt
securities were held by those with estates which would have been
liable for an estate tax. This evidence suggests more concentration
than indicated by any of the three other sources.
Since the Butters-Thompson-Bollinger evidence was collected by
interviews with a limited group of individuals selected for their
wealth, it cannot be used to estimate aggregates. But within the
income and wealth categories covered by Butters-Thompson-Bol-
linger in 1949, the proportions of state and local government secu-
rities found was quite consistent with those found in Atkinson. The
last two are the only ones that give us postwar evidence. Both
of them suggest that ownership of tax exempts, though concen-
trated in upper income groups, is not confined to them.
The Mendershausen study also presented a comparison of the
unadjusted holdings of state and local government securities in the
estates filing estate tax returns for a number of years. The degree
of variation among years in the proportions shown by these com-
parative figures is considerable. It suggests that single-date evidence
may be almost unreliable. Three of the four studies we use here
are single-date inquiries. Lent is the only one whose evidence was
not tied to the facts of a single year, and his evidence relates only
to aggregate holdings. Relative holdings appear in Table 10. These
values are reproduced in Chart 5.
As this chart shows, the proportion of tax-exempt securities in
big estates has been declining. There are, however, some year-to-
year variations that seem to reflect fluctuations in common stock
prices. For example, 1929 shows a low proportion of tax-exempt
10Op.cit.,p.116.
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TABLE 10





Grand total 3.34.4 6.1 5.7 3.9 3.3 2.7
Nontaxable 1.71.7 1.1 2.0 0.8 0.6 0.4
By size of netestate:
(thousandsof dollars)
Under 100 1.1 1.2 1.8 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.2
100-200 1.41.7 3.1 1.6 1.0 1.0 0.4
200-300 1.72.4 3.6 2.5 1.4 1.8 0.9
300-500 3.03.0 6.2 4.0 3.2 3.4 1.7
500-1,000 4.63.6 8.9 5.4 4.1 5.4 3.6















Source: 1922-46: From Study of Saving, Vol. iii, Tables E-21 to E-25. 1950:
From Statistics of Income, 1949, Part I, p. 324 to p. 328. 1955: From Statistics of
Income, 1955, Estate Tax Collections, Table 4, p. 16.
securities; presumably a reciprocal of the high equity prices. The
reverse is true of 1939. Although common stock prices were ad-
vancing during the 1950's, this does not seem to be a fully adequate
explanation of the smaller proportion of tax-exempt securities in
big estates. Large investors appear to have been convinced that
the attractions of capital gains far outweighed those of tax exemp-
tion. In fact, the extreme right-hand portions of several of the
curves in Chart 5 turn down, suggesting that tax exemption is used
more by middle-to-large investors than by the very largest investors.
This is particularly true in years of high equity prices.
Lent's and Atkinson's evidence suggest that some holders of state
and local government obligations—a majority by number of hold-
ers, but a minority by amount—have relatively modest incomes
and therefore take only partial advantage of tax exemption. Men-
dershausen's estimate minimizes the size of this group and an exam-
ination of the slope to the curves in Chart 5 would lead to the
same conclusions. The Butters-Thompson-Bollinger interviews can-
not be used to prepare aggregate estimates. The apparent conflict
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CHART5
State and Municipal Bonds as. a Percentage of
Gross Taxable Estates
of their evidence with that in other studies may be reconcilable.
Both Lent and Atkinson used size distributions of income; Mender-
shausen's estimates are based on a size distribution of estates or
wealth. An estimate of marginal tax rates applying to the holders
of tax-exempt securities, prepared by Harry Kahn of the staff of
the National Bureau of Economic Research and fully described in
the source notes to Table 27, supports the Mendershausen results
rather more than those of Lent or Atkinson.
From year to year, the income of a person is likely to vary con-
siderably more than his wealth; this must be particularly true of
wealthy individuals who depend on dividends and capital gains .for
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an appreciable part of their income. Thus the reports of any one
year might show some holders of state and local government secu-
rities receiving incomes that did not put much of a premium on
tax exemption. But over the full life cycle of these investors, em
ployment of funds in this way might have been entirely rational.
Wealth is less likely to vary than income (although market values
will fluctuate in fairly wide swings). Therefore the evidence that
state and local government securities are rare in smaller portfolios
is consistent not only with such facts as we have but also with in-
vestment logic.
Although tax-exempt securities are held mainly by upper income
and wealth groups, the proportion of assets in upper income or
upper wealth portfolios held in tax-exempt securities is modest.
Respondents to the Harvard interviews with wealthof $1 million
or more held 5 per cent of their portfolios in tax exempts. The
estate tax evidence (Table 10 •and Chart 5) shows that, in the
years covered, tax exempts averaged from 10 to 25 per cent of
estates of $5 million or more; with a median not far from 15 per
cent. At the $1 million to $2 million level, the range of the
ages was.from 5 to 13 per cent. Since these ratios are considerably
above the Harvard response, it appears that there may be a dif-
ference between the portfolios of living persons and the estates of
the deceased. Another possibility is that the respondents to the
Harvard interviews may have included an unusual proportion of
alumni who had profited by the investment example of Harvard
University itself and concentrated on equities.
Some clues in the Butters-Thompson-Bollinger interviews furnish
convincing reasons why the ratios of tax-exempt securities in large
portfolios may be small. An upper income individual is often rela-
tively little concerned with the production of current cash income;
capital 'gains' are far more desirable. Persons of wealth who are
aggressively trying to increase their estate further have relatively
little.use fOr tax-exempt obligations; they want assets that furnish
them oppOrtunities for capital' gains. It is only wealthy inves-
tors who were intent 'on capital preservation for the sake of income
production that are interested in tax exemption. The comments
reproduced from the interviews showed that aggressive investors
treated tax exempts almost with contempt; the return was• too
Wealth-conserving conservativeinvestors were the ones who
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bought tax exempts. This point is of considerable importance;
while portfolio shifts can account for part of the market for state
and local government securities, the rate of saving of those who
are interested in the purchase of tax-exempt securities must be an
important limit on the amount of such securities that individuals
can absorb from the market year after year. Our knowledge of life-
cycle income and saving is still unfortunately limited. But common
sense suggests that the rate of saving of those who are still attempt-
ing aggressively to build estates is probably higher(save in de-
pression years) than those who have settled down to the process
of capital and income preservation. Furthermore, tax-exempt secu-
rities are not the only or even the major means for minimizing
the tax burden on upper-income individuals. Investments in oil
royalties, in income-producing real estate, in various foreign ven-
tures, and even in life insurance have much the same final effects.
A variety of special provisions and exceptions to the individual
income tax have been created so that larger income receivers can
minimize their tax liabilities by means other than buying tax-
exempt securities. Among such features are: conversion of ordinary
income to capital gains, depreciation and depletion allowances,
income splitting, and rather generous gift provisions (particularly
on securities with unrealized capital gains), all of which permit
considerable minimizing of potential tax liabilities. Because of
these possibilities, investment in tax-exempt securities has lost some
of its appeal for upper income individuals. Estimates of the erosion
of the tax base have been made by Heller and by Peçhman."
The managers of trust accounts are important buyers of these
securities. Unpublished estimates by Goldsmith, Shapiro, and Men-
delson suggest that about half of the tax-exempt securities bought
by individuals are acquired for them by trustees, usually corporate
fiduciaries. The investment policies of professional trustees for trust
accounts differ greatly from those for individuals. The habits, tra-
ditions, and mores of trust investment put much more emphasis
on conservatism and capital preservation. It is quite likely that for
a given level of income and a given tax position, trust accounts
of which individuals are beneficiaries are more likely to use tax-
ii Walter W. Heller, "Limitations of the Federal Individual Income Tax,"
The Journal of Finance, May 1952, Vol. vii, No. 2, and Joseph A. Pechman,
"Erosion of the Individual Income Tax," National Tax Journal, March 1957,
Vol. x, No. 1.
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exempt obligations as an investment medium than would be true
of individuals themselves.
When the beneficial interest in a trust estate is divided between
a life tenant and a remainderman, the trustee has a problem in
equitable treatment of both. The life tenant is entitled to income,
the remainderman to principal. Since trust law frequently does
not require and frequently may not even allow amortization of
premiums unless specifically allowed for in the trust contract, the
trustee is forced to seek securities selling near par, where coupon
and yield are nearly equivalent. This gives rise to some of the
prejudice against both high coupon (premium) and low coupon.
(discount) obligations mentioned in Chapter 6.
This circumstance is sometimes reversed. If the remainderman
is also a trustee(or joint trustee) of the estate, and if the life
tenant is his mother he may deliberately invest some of the funds
in high-coupon tax-exempt securities. When the coupon is not
amortized this amounts to a mild kind of capital consumption. It
is a way of persuading mothers who are not very knowledgeable
about finance to consume capital without being aware that they
are doing so. It was even reported that some individuals deliber-
ately buy high-coupon tax exempts for their own portfolios as a
means of engaging in some mild capital consumption, a pleasant
deception. The tax rules do not require individuals to amortize
the income from premium securities; there would be no point to
such a requirement.
The irregularity in time of individual acquisitions of state and
local government securities suggests that they are not primarily
bought out of current saving but are acquired by portfolio rear-
rangement. The market potential, over the short run at least, is
much more a matter of relative yields than current savings. When
yields are attractive, portfolios will be shifted into tax-exempt form.
At the quite low yields of 1946, individuals reduced their holdings;
when yields became more attractive in 1948, they bought more
actively. The heavy acquisitions by individuals in 1953 and 1955
took place when money markets were tight and banks were not
buying. To bring out individual buying, yields had to go up con-
siderably. The level of equity prices is also doubtless a market fac-
tor of considerable significance. When individuals are bullish on
equities, their tax-exempt security buying suffers, but when the
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equity outlook grows• dim, tax-exempt buying by individuals be-
comes more important.
It would seem logical that to induce individuals to buy on a sub-
stantial scale the yields available to investors would have to com-
pare favorably with• those available on fully taxed sources of in-
terest or dividend income. The levels of income of those individuals
who hold most of the tax-exempt securities is such as to put them
in quite high tax brackets. The Harvard survey suggested that most
of the holdings were among those with annual incomes, of $50,000
or more. lEn 1949, when that survey was made, the marginal rate
of federal income taxationfor.. this minimum was 59 per cent.
Even at $25,000 annual income—certainly the lower level accord-
ing to .both the Atkinson .and Harvard study for an appreciable
degree of concentration—the marginal rate was '38. per cent. It
seems likely, therefore, that individuals do not make close or pre-
cise comparisons as do institutional investors; their judgments are
more general. But they also look toward the longer-term advantage;
longer-term judgments are necessarily even less precise. No one
could ever make a close choice 'between the hope for capital gains
and the certainty of federal 'income tax exemption.
Individuals not in higher income brackets who nevertheless 'own
tax-exempt securities are still to be accounted for; our knowledge
of them is limited. We do know that' many very' small issues are
marketed locally and that these issues sometimes yield almost as
much as fully taxed security incomes. A local investor with little
expert investment knowledge and considerable mistrust of the cen-
tral capital markets may be quite willing to invest in local munici-
pal obligations even though his use of tax exemption is slight.
Local pride and sentiment may support such action. A school board
member or possibly even a schoolteacher may buy bonds on the
local' school district, even with relatively' low marginal tax rates.
The importance of this local market is discussed in Chapter '4.
One unhappy possibility must be mentioned. It is quite well
established that federal income tax collections cover only a frac-
tion of the volume of interest payments. The best evidence avail-
able suggests that only about 35 to 40 per cent of it is reported
by taxpayers.'2 Taxpayers who do not pay taxes on their taxable
12Notedby Selma Goldsmith in her "Appraisal of Basic Data for Constructing
Income Size in Part vi of Studies in Income and Wealth 13
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interest income obviously have little use for tax-exempt securities.
We know very little about the income levels at which such under-
reporting takes place, but evidence developed by Holland and Kahn
from Audit Control Program records suggests the frequency of un-
derreportin.g is greater at low income levels. But an appreciable
portion of the dollar volume of underreporting is at higher income
levels.
THE MARKET FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
OBLIGATIONS AMONG COMMERCIAL BANKS
Commercial banks follow close On the heels of individuals as
the second most important group of investors in tax-exempt secu-
rities. Among institutional investors they are the most important
by a wide margin. Commercial bank holdings hit their high-water
mark at the end of 1951 or in early 1952, when they accounted
for just over 35 per cent of all private holdings. This mark was
reached after seven years of strong buying. Since that time, com-
mercial banks have added to their holdings, but as total offerings
have grown even more, the commercial bank share has declined.
The first absolute decline in bank holdings of tax-exempt securi-
ties during the postwar decade came in the second half of 1955.
Commercial banks, like individuals, have been irregular buyers,
dominating the market mainly in periods of easy money and with-
drawing from it in tight money periods. Since commercial banks
and individuals are the two most important buying groups, the
timing of their participation seems to alternate. The principal fea-
tures of bank ownership and participation are shown in Table 11.
The relationship of bank buying to money market conditions
and the state of bank reserves is fully appreciated by the market
itself. Indeed, the response of yields on state and local government
obligations to Federal Reserve credit actions is sometimes more
violent than that of federal government obligations. Even before
1951, which marks the postwar revival of a free and flexible
Federal Reserve credit policy, the market for state and local gov-
(National Bureau, 1951). Expanded more recently by D. M. Holland and C.
Harry Kahn in a paper, "Comparison of Personal and Taxable Income," which
appears in the Joint Committee Print of papers submitted by panelists appear-
ing before the Joint. Committee of the Economic Report on the subject Federal
Tax Policy for Economic Growth and Stability, 84th Congress,1stSession,
pp. 313-38.
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TABLE 11
Commercial Banks' Holdings of State and Local Government
Securities, 1945-1956
(dollar amOunts in millions)
Acquisi- Change in
tions Amounts
asa Ratio Held asa
of Change HoldingsRatio of
Per Cent in Totalas a Ratio Earning
of TotalChange inPrivateof EarningAsset
Year-AmountPrivatelyAmountHoldingsAssetsChanges
End Held Held Held(per cent) (per cent) (per cent)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1945 5,970 25.4 3.2
1946 4,395 28.0 425 634.Sa 5.9 b
1947 5,276 30.9 881 62.8 4.5 39.5
1948 5,661 29.5 585 18.5 5.0 b
1949 6,548 30.9 887 43.3 5.4 15.0
1950 8,118 53.9 1,570 57.8 6.4 24.2
1951 9,198 35.5 1,080 54.3 6.9 18.2
1952 10,189 35.7 991 87.7 7.2 11.0
1953 10,821 33.5 632 16.9 7.4 15.6
1954 12,586 34.3 1,765 40.0 8.1 17.5
1955 12,698 31.7 112 3.4 7.9 2.5
1956 12,901 30.0 203 6.8 7.8 4.8
a Increase in total was negligible.
b Earning assets declined.
SOurce: Col. 1: Table A-S. col.1; Col. 2: Table A-4, col.1; Cols. 3 and 4
computed from Table A-3; Cols. 5 and 6 computed from earning assets of
Commercial Banks from Annual Report, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
ernment obligations responded with alacrity to the shape of credit
policy. For example, in 1948 member bank reserve requirements
were increased three different times. This action appears to have
had more effect on bank purchases of tax-exempt securities than
it did on their loans. Since the Federal Reserve System was still
supporting the prices of Treasury securities,it could offset the
reserves created by such action only by selling short-term obliga-
tions or raising reserve requirements. The third increase during
that year was under temporary authority given at that time under
compromise anti-inflation legislation. Bank reserves could hardly
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have been called tight; still, there was a halt in the expansion of
deposits and currency. Under these circumstances, banks continued
to increase their loans, though less rapidly than in 1947, and to
sell Treasury obligations. investment in tax exempts slowed down.
This seems to characterize tax-exempt investment fairly well in
general commercial bank policy during the postwar period: loans
have top priority, but tax exempts come next and seem to lead
all other forms of security investment in general favor. All during
the decade, relative holdings of Treasury securities have been
slowly dwindling. The only type of security acquired in appreci-
able volume, other than tax exempts, has been railroad equipment
obligations. Though short maturities are available, these sometimes
seem to have been bought more for reasons of customer relations
than for reason of investment preference.
Commercial bank acquisition of tax exempts slackened in mid-
1952, when monetary policy became a bit sterner; and continued
to be slow through 1953. Again in 1955, tight money took the banks
out of this market almost completely. Easy money also seems to
stimulate purchases: banks were heavy buyers (relative to offerings)
in early 1947, and in the second half of 1949 and all of 1950. From
mid-1949 to mid-1950 these purchases could be attributed largely
to easy money conditions, but in the second half of 1950 the Korean
war episode sparked the conviction (wholly false, as events turned
out) that there might be a shortage of tax-exempt obligations.
Easy money clearly seems to have been the major stimulant of
heavy bank purchases in 1954.
This concentration of bank purchases in periods of easy money
would be expected to have an adverse effect on their earnings from
these obligations; they buy when yields• are low and prices are
high. The very fact of their withdrawal from the market increases
yields. Banks bid securities away from other holders in 1946 when
total state and local government debt was still declining. And they
paid very high prices. Their concentrated purchases in 1949-1950
coincided with declining yields; this also happened in 1954. On
the other hand, banks were not in a position to take full advantage
of the higher yields prevailing in 1948, 1953, and 1955. In fact,
commercial banks secured higher yields in spite of what appears
to have been disadvantageous timing for their principal purchases.
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Such crude estimates as can :be made .ofthe rate of earnings
realized by commercial banks from their holdings. of state and
local .governmentsecuritieS suggest Ithat .theseholdings have .prO-
duced a materially 'better after-tax income than, was received from
other securities. This judgment.' is necessarily crude;. the earnings
reports' of insured commercial banks' on which our estimates are
.based do not distinguish between state and local government, and
corporate securities, in the "other" security category. By use of the
ratio between fully taxable and tax-exempt yields in the market
such a division has been estimated, as shown in Table 12. This
estimate is probably a reasonable approximation of the rate' of
earnings from the state and local government securities held by
commercial banks. The. estimate cannot be far wide of the truth
because these securities constitute such ,a large fraction of the
"other" securities group in the earnings reports. Conversely, the im-
plied yields for' corporate' obligations secured by this method of
estimation probably,should not be made to bear the weight of
much interpretative analysis.
The privilege of tax exemption and availability of short matu-
rities accounts for a 'large part .of the interest of' .banks
in the purchase of state and local government securities. Commer-
cial banks are in a relatively exposed investment position; very
few other financial corporations, or at least ,those sizable
amounts of funds to invest,, are as fully exposed' to ,tax pressures.
When the income on an appreciable volume of federal, securities
was tax exempt, commercial banks were important buyers of them;
indeed, until World War II, commercial banks paid relatively small
amounts of federal income taxes. But when the federal government
ceased to allow exemption from taxation for its own obligations
in 1941, the only source of new issues so exempt was from state
and local governments. During World War II, the volume of such
new issues was negligible, but commercial banks bought state and
local government securities aggressively in the secondary market.
During that period, and particularly near the end of the war, life
insurance companies and individuals' were net', sellers and commer-
cial banks net buyers of state and local government obligations.
Commercial banks are denied by law or tradition the other in-
vestment outlets that are used by some investors to reduce the load
of taxation. They' cannot buy oil royalties. They cannot' invest in
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TABLE 12
Estimated Yield Earned on State and Local Securities
by Insured Commercial Banks, 1946-1955
Aa Corp..Estimated
Yield to Yield Earned










1946 $ 4,301 $3,593 $176.6 2.06 1.51
1947 5,131 3,622 179.4 1.70 1.59
1948 5,511 3,421 189.6 1.44 1.82
1949 6,403 3,574 201.7 1.44 1.75
1950 7,959 4,192 225.4 1.53 1.57
1951 9,016 4,058 249.5 1.63 1.60
1952 10,006 3,867 277.0 1.52 1.74
1953 10,620 3,758 297.7 1.30 1.92
1954 .12,387 3,634 324.8 1.42 1.85
1955 12,501 3,442 351.0 1.36 2.04
1956 12,717 2,829 370.0 1.34 .2.24
Source: Annual Report of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporations: I
and 2, assets and liabilities of operating banks in the U.S. "obligations of states,
etc." and "other bonds, etc." plus "corporate stock" respectively; 'CoL 3, earn-
ings, expenses, and dividends of insured commercial banks "interest and divi-
dends on other securities"; Col. 4, ratio of Moody's Aa corporate bond yields to
Aa municipal bond yields (yearly averages); Col. 5Cot. 3 ±Cot.1 + Col. 2
X Col. 4.'
Stated in symbolic terms:
If S =amountof state and local government securities
rate of return from state and local government securities
0 =amountof securities S -
= rateof return from "other" securities




whichmay be transformed into r which is formula for
s +ocomputation of Col. 5.
In Table 14, col.1is S; col. 2 isO; col.- 3 is I;
and coL5 isr8.
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dividend paying equities that promise capital appreciation taxed
at the capital gains rate. They cannot invest in rental real estate
properties on which depreciation may be charged. Thus the alter-
natives open to commercial banks are limited and most of these
alternatives involve a tax liability.
Banks are also doubtless moved to invest in state and local gov-
ernment securities by virtue of the fact that they can underwrite
and deal in them. The Banking Act of 1933 denied commercial
banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System the right
to underwrite and deal in corporate securities or to operate sub-
sidiaries which engaged in this business. But state and local gov-
ernment obligations based on full faith and general credit were
exempt from this prohibition. The great money market banks com-
bine the operation of large investment portfolios of such securities
with underwriting and dealing of the broadest sort. The two com-
plement one another: the strategic position of an underwriter gives
such banks the chance of acquiring new offerings on a most ad-
vantageous basis. And the dealer role increases the liquidity of such
a bank portfolio considerably. The dealer department can work
off holdings with less loss and more dispatch than is true of in-
vestors who must use the facilities of outside dealers.'
Smaller banks also have an added interest in state and local gov-
ernment securities by virtue of the fact they can originate and deal
in them. Banks, except in the great money markets, are basically
local enterprises. They are tied by sentiment and by the pressure
of customers to the welfare of their neighborhoods. Banks are al-
ways under pressure to support local finance, including the finance
of local governmental units. A great many banks which do not
consider themselves formal underwriters or dealers in state and
local government obligations nevertheless do bid on and deal in
the securities of nearby governmental units, albeit rather casually.
In fact, the securing of the deposit balances of nearby local gov-
ernmental units is not unrelated to the willingness of a bank to
bid on and hold the securities of such a governmental unit. In this
sense something approaching the customer relationship prevails.
Even though the formalities of the open market—the public auc-
tion and bidding and the public announcemer.t of depositary re-
lationships—may prevail, the realities are more nearly those of ne-
gotiated arrangements. This is not to imply that such relationships
86THE SUPPLY OF FUNDS BY INVESTORS
are improper. Quite the contrary, they only illustrate the strong
tendency in the economic history of the United States for imper-
sonal open-market relationships to be superseded by customer rela-
tionships which are responsive to considerations other than price.
This negotiated relationship, however, clearly tends to limit the
marketability of state and local government securities acquired in
this way. 'Technically these securities are negotiable and the right
of the owner to sell is unquestioned. But a banker who sold his
holdings of the securities of local governmental units would be
exposing himself to two kinds of criticism. In the first place, the
issuing governmental unit might be offended; the sale would limit
their power to sell further obligations. But beyond that, buyers
would fear that a local banker had inside knowledge of local ftnan-
cial affairs, that he was selling to avoid expected unpleasantness.
As a matter of practice, therefore, many small banks treat their
holdings of nearby local state and government securities as having
no greater degree of liquidity than that possessed by local loans.
Not only that but in some circumstances of distress, local govern-
mental authorities expect the local banker to furnish a market for
such previously issued obligations as may turn up in the secondary
market.
The great money market banks are not exempt from such in-
fluences. The fiscal authorities even of large cities and states are
quite conscious of the identity of buyers for their securities. They
think of buying banks as "friendly" and while they might not call
those which sell their securities or fail to bid on them as "hostile"
they certainly take a cool view of them. The fiscal authorities fol-
low closely which banks organize or participate in buying groups
that bid on their securities; they distinguish between those which
"give them a good price" as over against bids which they interpret
as ducking the market. During periods of adversity in the market,
the banking underwriters very likely may feel a little more com-
pelled to maintain a continuity of functioning than nonbanking
dealers simply for this reason.
Banks, particularly those acting as underwriters and dealers in
the securities of neighboring governmental units, doubtless play an
important role in influencing the general financial policies of such
bodies, as is generally true of customer relationships.
Since state and local government obligations are issued in serial
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form, the new issues market supplies some quantity of short-term
obligations of the type traditionally preferred by commercial banks.
This is also true of equipment trust obligations, but not of most
other corporate obligations. Commercial banks, when their demand
has been strong, have sometimes pushed beyond the range of matu-
rities ordinarily acceptable to banks. The maturity distribution of
bank holdings in June 1947 and in June 1956 is shown in Table 13.
TABLE 13
Maturity of State and Local Government Obligations Owned
by Insured Commercial Banks, June 30, 1947 and June 30, 1956
•Amountin Millions PerCent
.
• 1917 •1956 1947 1956
Maturingin one year orless 813 1,931 16.9 15.2
Maturingin1to 5 years 1,420 4,437 29.5 34.9
Maturingin 5 to 10 years 1,269 3,825 26.3 30.0
Maturing
Maturing
in 10 to 20 years





Total 4,828 12,731 100.0 100.0
For reasons mentioned in Chapter 4 and explained more fully
in Appendix B,banksand dealers are presumably the principal
buyers of the high-coupon short-term maturities of state and local
government securities. If a bank has dealer status, these securities
have tax advantages since a dealer bank is not required. to amortize
the premium for a security held less than 30 days or having a
maturity more than five years. In such a case the loss of premium
may be treated as a capital loss while the coupon income is fully
tax exempt. But even those banks which must amortize the pre-
miums may still be able to improve their yield by virtue of their
willingness to fuss with the mechanics of accrual accounting for
income from securities. They can profit from the prejudice other
investors seem to have against high coupon obligations.'3
Direct evidence on the quality of state and local government
securities purchased by banks is thin. Unquestionably the super-
'3DavidDurand and Willis J. Winn, Basic Yield of Bonds, 1926-1947: Their
Measurement and Pattern, Technical Paper 6 (National Bureau, 1947), Adden-
dum, pp. 31-40.
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visory authorities have urged high standards on banks. Probably
the most comprehensive supervisory attention to this has been given
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. That agency has
regularly had at least one specialist in this field spending full time
on the subject. The influence of this supervisory agency has been
felt in the private and undocumented form of examiners' com-
ments and in the more public form of statements and speeches.'4
Even though official pressure for adherence to high qualitative
standards is put on banks, they cannot acquire securities that are
better than those being issued. Banks often have been the leading
factor in the new issues market. Furthermore, they usually concen-
trate their purchases in the shorter maturities of the new offerings.
Thus to find the volume of securities they have frequently bought,
banks had to accept the general average of market quality.
THE MARKET FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
OBLIGATIONS AMONG FIRE AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANIES
While fire and casualty insurance companies have always held a
few state and local government obligations, the expansion of these
holdings to major proportions and the emergence of these institu-
tions as leading factors in the tax-exempt market did not come
until near the end of the postwar decade. This development' may
be seen in Table 14, which shows these holdings both as a fraction
of total private holdings and also as a fraction of fire and casualty
company assets. Since 1948 these companies have devoted a very
large fraction of their new funds to' the purchase of state and local
government securities.
The importance of fire and casualty insurance companies as buy-
ers of state and local government securities, is due, as might be
14 As, for example, the following addresses by Raymond E. Hengren, Assistant
Chief, Division of Research and' Statistics, Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora.
tion. "Factors in Evaluation of Municipal. Bonds," Commercial and Financial
Chronicle, June 21, 1951, pp. 2.8 (an address before the Florida Bankers' Asso-
ciation). "Municipal Bonds as Bank Investments," mimeographed, pp. 21-28
(an address before the Ninth Tennessee Bankers Conference, September 7-il,
1952). "Municipal Bonds in Bank Portfolios," Commercial and Financial Chron-
icle, September 13, 1951, pp. 6.8 (an address before the School of Banking of
the South Louisiana State University). Municipal Security Analysis and Bank
Investment Problems, Finance Officers Association of the United
States and Canada, August 1953 (from a paper given during the 47th Annual
Conference of the Association).
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TABLE 14
Fire and Casualty Insurance Company Holdings of State and Local
Government Securities, Annually, 1945-1956




of Change asa of Available
Per Cent in TotalRatio of Funds
of Total Increase Privately Total Invested in
Year AmountPrivatelyin Amount Held Assets State & Local
End Held Held Held (per cent)(per cent)Obligations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1945 $ 249 1.6 3.2
1946 237 1.5 —12 —17.9 2.8
1947 315 1.8 78 5.6
1948 544 2.8 229 11.0 5.2
1949 828 284 13.9 6.8
1950 1,144 4.8 316 11.6 8.5
1951 1,448 5.6 304 15.3 9.8
1952 1,871 6.6 423 16.1 11.4
1953 2,619 8.1 748 20.0 14.7
1954 3,402 9.3 783 17.8 16.7
1955 4,195 10.5 793 23.8 18.8 all
1956 4,916 11.4 72J 24.3 21.5 all
Source:Col.1:Table A-3, col.4;Col.2: Table A-4, col.4;Cols.3 and 4 computed
from Table A-3; Col. 5: computed from total assets of fire and casualty insurance companies
in Best's Fire and Casualty Aggregates and Averages. Column 6: Roy Reierson and Sally Ronk,
The Investment Outlook for 1956 (Bankers Trust Company, February 1956), Table 11, page 48.
The asset figures on which Cot. 5 is based are at market value. In order to estimate the pro.
portion of new funds available for investment which was applied to the purchase of tax-exempt
securities it would have been necessary to adjust for changes in market value of securities held
at the beginning of the period as well as purchased during the period covered. Since we were
not in a to make such an adjustment, we used an approximation worked out by the
Bankers Trust Company in its estimates of sources and uses of funds in the capital markets.
guessed, largely to their exposure •to tax liabilities. To a lesser
extent these holdings also represent liquidity reserves; they are
combined with the holdings of other high-grade fixed dollar value
obligations as general reserves against underwriting risks.
The basic investment rule prevailing among fire and casualty
companies is that business liabilities should be covered by cash,
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receivables, and "money" bonds. "Money" bonds can be long-term
as well as short-term, but they must be high grade. Business liabili-
ties include unearned premium reserves and reserves for unsettled
and unreported losses, as well as the normal liabilities. In addition,
the laws of a number of states put rules on the form of investment
of the capital of these insurance companies. In practice, the com-
panies seem to fulfill their liquidity requirements in a number of
ways. Some take them quite literally and hold rather short-term
obligations, but others invest in relatively long-term obligations as
liquidity reserves.
Fire and casualty insurance companies seem to be bound by the
rule that dividends on their own stock shall be paid only out of
investment income, while underwriting profits, if any, are plowed
back into the business. This practice has the effect of putting rather
severe income pressure on the investment managers of stock com-
panies, which in turn produces a conflict of business interests. To
raise capital, fire and casualty companies need be able to attract
equity investors. The attraction of such investors depends on the
ability of stock companies to produce investment income (since
underwriting income, in effect, is not available for distribution to
stockholders). But the production of maximum investment income
may impair liquidity and therefore the ability to undertake the
primary business of these concerns: the writing of insurance.
Capital gains on equities also play a role. If a company with
relatively low capital funds has the skill or good fortune to achieve
substantial capital gains (whether realized or not), then its basic
capital position is strengthened. And to the extent the equities
that produced these capital gains pay dividends at a rate above
interest yield on bonds, so much the better. Under such circumstances,
unrealized capital gains may be better than realized gains. In other
words, fire and casualty insurance companies may become reluctant
sellers of equities. But when they consider the level of equity prices
high, they may overcome their reluctance, sell and reinvest in tax-
exempt securities. The yields on state and local government obliga-
tions during the first half of the postwar decade discounted most
of the advantage of such investment; fire and casualty insurance
companies bought Treasury securities and railroad equipment obli-
gations for liquidity protection. But in the later years of the dec-
ade, state and local government yields became relatively more fa-
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vorable. At the same time equity prices, rose and the capital gain
potential in them became less
Such ,a general account of why fire and casualty insurance corn-
panics might be interested in state and local government securities
conceals great differences, among companies; Individual companies
sometimes suffer underwriting losses so severe that for several years
they do not have to worry about taxes. During 1955 almost all of
the net funds of fire and casualty insurance companies went into
tax-exempt securities; But even in that year a significant number
of individual exceptions emerged. An analysis of the investment
policies of 73 of the leading companies showed the following
15
Fractionof Net Funds available for In-
• '
'vestmentGoing into State and Local Number of
Government Securities during 1955 Companies
"All" (and sometimes more due to
sale of other securities) . , 17
"Most" (interpreted as over one-half) 25
"Some" (less than half) . 14
"N,o transactions" 10
"Net, sellers" . 7
73
Fire and casualty insurance companies buy mainly high quality
state and local government securities. Indeed, some companies are
reported to have the rule of buying nothing less than Aa bonds.
It seems to .beagreed that most of these companies have been im-
portant buyers of the PHA bonds. Reports of toll road bond own-
ership can be found, but it appears that such holdings are limited
to bonds of toll roads. already in proved and successful operation.
The maturity policies followed are nowhere near as uniform. It
appears that some companies limit purchases to the early
ties—sometimes to .as short. a limit as the first five years—but in
other cases purchases are made of relatively long-term bonds. Since
fire and casualty companies are reputed to prefer state bonds over
the bonds of local governmental subdivisions, this fact alone tends
to put some limit on maturities since state bonds average to be
'15Privatelycirculated memorandum by Shelby Cullom Davis, "Insurance and
Investment Exposure during 1955 for Fire and Casualty Companies," March 9,
1956.
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shorter in maturity, than the others.b6 .Ingeneral these .companies
are buyers of "intermediate"..' maturities .
THEMARKET FOR STATE LOCAL. GOVERNMENT
SECURITIES AMONG. LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES.
AND .MUTUALSAVINGS BANKS
During most of the postwar decade neither life insurance compa-
nies nor mutual savings banks were material factors in the market
for state and local government securities. This was a change from
past policies: once upon a time these institutions were important
buyers of state and local government obligations. Prior to World
War I, when tax exemption was of no market value, mutual savings
banks were the leading institutional investor in such obligations.17
They held from one-fOurth to one-fifth of the amount in private
hands. Indeed, mutual. savings banks holdings remained fairly large
until the opening of WOrld War II, when other investors who val-
ued tax exemption more highly bid away these holdings. Life in-
surance companies became significant investors in state and. local
government obligations mainly after the 1920's, when demand for
funds from other sources dried up. Between .1929and 1935 life
insurance companies doubled their holdings even though the
gross privately held debt of state and local governments was grow-
ing only slightly. During this period other investors, principally
individuals, were net sellers, apparently because of uncertainty with
respect to the future of these obligations. By this action, life in-
surance companies showed themselves courageous as well as shrewd
investors. Their reward was rather handsome profits. These hold-
ings were increased still further until they hit a peak level in 1941.
Life insurance companies themselves were never in a position
to take full advantage of income tax exemption. The exemption
had some value to them but. far less than, to many others. In any.
event, life insurance companies, like mutual savings banks, began
a large-scale liquidation of their portfolios during World War II.
The cycle of acquisition and then liquidation ran a bit later for
16InvestmentPolicies of Fire and Casualty Insurance Companies, by J. W.
Middendorf II, privately published by Wood, Struthers & Co., cites a great many
individual cases reflective of these variations in maturity policy. See pp. 23, 33,
.43, 47-48, 53, 63, 72-73,and78. ' .
'7 Lent,The Ownership of Tax-Exempt Securities, 1913-1953, Appendix B,
Table B-i, p. 128.' ,
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life insurance than for the mutual savings banks, but the circum-
stances and relative amounts were much like one another. Both
of them had disposed of major fractions of these portfolios by the
time the postwar period was reached.
Rebuilding did not start until several years after the postwar
decade started, roughly in 1948, as shown in Table 15 for life
TABLE 15
Life Insurance Company Holdings of State and Local Government
Securities, Annually, 1945-1956




of Change Change in
Per Cent in. TotalHoldingsAmount Held
of Total Change Privatelyas a Ratio as a Ratio
Year Amount Privatelyin Amount Held of Assets of Increase
End Held Held Held (per cent)(per cent) in Assets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1945 722 4.6 1.6
1946 614 3.9 —108 —161.2 1.3 —3.2
1947 609 3.6 —5 —O.4 1.2 —0.1
1948 872 4.6 263 12.6 1.6 7.0
1949 1,052 5.0 180 8.8 1.8 4.4
1950 1,152 4.8 100 3.7 1.8 2.3
1951 1,170 4.5 18 0.9 1.7 0.4
1952 1,153 4.0 —17 —0.6 1.6 —0.3
1953 1,298 4.0 145 3.9 1.6 2.8
1954 1,846 5.0 548 12.4 2.2 9.2
1955 2,038 5.1 192 5.8 2.2 3.2
1956 2,273 5.3 235 7.9 2.4 4.2
Source: Ce!.1:Table A.3, cot.3;Cot.2:Table A.4, cot.3;Cols.3 and 4 computed
from Table A-3; Cols. 5 and 6 computed from total assets of life insurance companies in the
Life insurance Fact Book.
insurance companies. Both life insurance companies and mutual
savings banks revived their interest in state and local government
obligations because of the favorable yields which were available
on sOme of the new revenue obligations. As described in Chapter
7, this type of financing parallels that prevailing in corporate en-
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terprises. The credit problems, the standards of security analysis,
the general economic background that dominates the choices are
quite similar. The investment departments of life insurance
panics and mutual savings banks which dealt with corporate fi-
nancing were able to turn to these obligations without having to
learn new routines and procedures.
Tax exemption is not without some appeal to both of these
types of institutions. Life insurance companies have never been tax
exempt per Se, though the formulae under which they have been
taxed have sometimes had that effect. But the issue of life insur-
ance company taxation never seems to be finally settled. At present
life insurance companies are subject to an investment income tax of
6½ per cent.'8 Aper cent yield on a tax-exempt security provides
a price advantage of about 23 basis points or 1/4ofone per cent,
usually enough to make toll road bonds fully competitive with
corporate obligations.
Mutual savings banks, or at least somethem, have recently
been given an even more compelling reason for being interested
in tax exemption. En 1951 these institutions were subjected to fed-
eral income taxation at the corporate rates—with an exception.
Those institutions which have capital funds equal to less than 12
per cent of deposit liabilities are, in effect, exempt from the im-
position of income taxes. Only a few mutual savings banks have
capital funds of 12 per cent or more, but these few included some
very large mutual savings banks. The value of tax exemption be-
came material to those banks. Others, cognizant of the fact that
laws can be changed, found it prudent to acquire a few tax exempts
when the opportunity to do so without material yield concession
presented itself. Toll road financing during these years offered
frequent opportunities of exactly this sort.
These two classes of institutions may have accounted for as much
as one-quarter of the toll road bonds sold during the second half
of the postwar decade.
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, AND THE FUNDS THEY
CONTROL AS INVESTORS IN THEIR OWN SECURITIES
State and local governments, or the special funds they control,
invest in their own securities. Since these governments or their
18Smalllife insurance companies are taxed half this rate.
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creatures are exempt from tax as such, it seems a violation of in-
vestment logic for them to own their own securities. Several rea-
sons account, for the practice. In the first place, the general convic-
tion prevails that a governmental unit will fare better in new fi-
nancing if its outstanding securities are strong on the secondary
market. Buying by the issuer obviously helps.19 Some local admin-
istrators of funds doubtless have had limited investment experi-
ence; they feel more confident in their judgments of the securities
issued by their own government or 'nearby or well-known govern-
mental units; they hesitate to embark on dealing in the national
market for a wider range of securities. "Deep-discount" low-coupon
bonds sometimes turn up on the secondary market at yields whIch
are competitive with fully taxable issues; in such cases buying them
serves the purposes of supporting local government finance with-
out any concession in return.
Of all the factors, the overwhelming reason for this practice
is'probably provincialism or parochialism: good old-fashioned
"keep-your-money-at-home" spirit. The laws governing investment
of state and local governmental pension and retirement funds' usu-
ally permit and sometimes specify investment in their own secu-
rities. These funds, incidentally, are a growing portion of all state
and' lOcal government holdings, from about two-fifths of them in
1945 to over half at present. Table 16 shows the details.
OTHER INVESTORS IN STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT OBLIGATIONS
The estimates of ownership of state and local government obli-
gations shown in Table 8 above (presented fully in Appendix A)
list only three categories of investors not already discussed: non-
bank dealers, taxable corporations, and fraternal societies. These
three for less thanper cent of private hold-
ings. Since fraternal society holdings appear to be dwindling at
about the rate at which such securities might be expected to ma-
ture, it ident'that they are 'not a market factor' of much sig-
nificance. But the other two have rather more importance.
'Nonfinancial coiporations buy some state and local government
It is believed that their purchases are mainly of short-
19Thepoint is developed at somewhat great length in Chapter 5.
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TABLE 16
State and Local Government Securities Owned by the State and
Local Governments Themselves, Annually, 1945-1956
(dollar amounts in millions)
Source:CoL 1: Table A-2, col. 2; Col. 2: Table A-2, col. 2 divided by col. 1; Cot. 3: Table A-2,
change in col. 2; Col. 4: Table A-2, change in col. 2 divided by change in col. 1; Cot. 5: interpola-
tiOn of Bureau of the Census June data supplemented by unpublished estimates by Duane
Saunders; COl. 6: Table A-2, change in cot. 5 divided by change in cot. 1.
term ones such as PHA temporary notes. Since corporate treasurers
have learned about money market investment of temporarily idle
funds, both the Treasury bill market and the market for high-
grade short-term tax exempts have furnished such an outlet. Most
of our formal knowledge of such• holdings, however, comes from
the reports of fully tax-exempt interest received shown in the Part
2 (Corporate) section of the Statistics of Income. Publication of
these data is greatly delayed; at the moment 1954 is the latest year
available. The capitalizing of such interest returns requires selec-







































1946 2363 12.8 —469
1947 2451 12.2 88
1948 2593 11.6 142
1949 3104 12.5 511
1950 .3587 ., 12.8 483
1951 3785 12.4 .198
1952 4025 11.9 240
1953 4354 11.6 329
1954 4690 11.2 336
1955 .5078 11.1 388
































9.2THE SUPPLY OF FUNDS BY INVESTORS
the results show quite a lot of random variability. This evidence
is of dubious reliability, however, because a similar estimate of
bank holdings by capitalizing the fully tax-exempt interest they
report varies considerably from the known facts. Nonfinancial cor-
porations unquestionably buy short-term high grade obligations, but
our knowledge of how much is slight; the series shown in Table 8
is presented rather tentatively. In early 1956 Fortune Magazine
conducted a survey of the short-term investment portfolios of 276
large corporations.2° This survey showed holdings of $240 million
near the end of 1955. This would project to a total of about $1
billion if current assets were used for the blow-up ratio. The esti-
mates shown in Appendix Ahavebeen adjusted to take account
of this evidence, but they remain rather rough at best.
Nonbank dealers also present a problem. As our comments in
Chapter 5 on the secondary market will indicate, dealers' inven-
tories of securities are a factor of dominant market importance.. But
a large fraction of dealers inventories, such as shown in the Blue
List, are on a "when issued" (WI) basis. Such securities are not
yet issued and so not a part of the ownership record. On the other
hand, it seems equally evident that dealers carry considerably larger
inventories than are shown in the Blue List. Our evidence is as
follows:
The Wharton study of over-the-counter markets developed an
estimate of dealer holdings of state and holdings that
was more than four times the figures of shown inventory according
to the Blue List for the same date.2' Second, a few brokers and
dealers publish financial statements. The total state and local gov-
ernment holdings shown by several of these were compared with
Blue List offerings for the same dates. The balance sheet totals
were almost invariably considerably more than were shown in the
Blue List. Some brokers and dealers own tax-exempt securities even
though they. are relatively inactive in underwriting or dealing in
them.
It appears that such holdings perform a very real investment
function; firms use them as a means of employing their capital.
When firms can qualify as dealers and so do not have to amortize
20 Reported in the August 1956 issue, "Short-Term Investment Portfolios of
276 Large Corporations."
21 Irwin Friend et al., The Over-the-Counter Securities Markets, Table 5-1,
p. 263.
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such high coupon issues as are turned over in less than 30 days,
the tax advantage of such an investment is quite attractive.
The figure shown by the Wharton study cited above for nonbank
dealers was used as the base figure in our ownership estimates.
Changes were made by capitalizing tax-exempt interest income re-
ported in Part 2 of the Statistics of Income blown up to cover non-
incorporated brokers and dealers.
SOME CONCLUSIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE SIZE OF MARKET
FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OBLIGATIONS
State governments and governmental units at lower levels have
unquestionably benefited in some measure from the privilege of
selling securities that offer the investor exemption from federal in-
come taxes. But this advantage has also had a clear counterpart:
the market for state and local government obligations has had to
be found among investors exposed to income taxation. Investors
who are tax exempt perse—pensionfunds, most savings and loan
associations22 and mutual savings banks, and nonprofit foundations,
for example—are not interested in such a market. Those who have
limited tax liabilities—life insurance companies and lower income
individuals, for example—have only a mild interest in thismarket.
If, as some feel, the future direction of institutional investment is
toward those institutions with limited tax liabilities or none at all,
this forecasts a further discounting of the value of the privilege
of borrowing on a tax-exempt basis.
Furthermore, state and local government securities are not the
first preference of any important group of investors. Commercial
banks prefer loans. Individuals, and fire and casualty companies,
prefer equities—most of the time. Savings and loan associations,
mutual savings banks, and life insurance companies allprefer
mortgages. State and local government obligations are the second
choice of many investors, the first choice of very few.
This must account for some of the jerky quality to the market
for state and local government obligations and to their price in-
stability. When banks can find all the loans they want, they do not
buy tax exempts; when fire and casualty companies think equity
prices are reasonable, they do not buy tax exempts. And, as a class,
22Mostsavings and loan associations do not have authority to invest in these
obligations so the issue is largely academic.
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individuals do not seem to have a true preference for tax-exempt
obligations. They require a fairly clear price 'advantage to be en-
ticed into the market. They will not pay out most of the value
of, tax exemption in buying as the commercial banks seem to do
in periods of easy money. It is true that commercial banks and in-
dividuals have tended to put funds into this market at somewhat
different phases of the yield cycle, a factor that tends to have a
steadying influence. But unfortunately it has not been a strong
enough influence to offset other unstabilizing influences.
All of this argues that the borrowing advantage of tax exemption
becomes seriously depreciated except when the volume of market
offerings is small, when all of the new offerings can find a resting
place in the portfolios of those who actively resist tax liabilities.
This is quite parallel to the point made by Shaw-Gurley: an increase
in their "direct finance ratio" (direct investment by individuals to
total investment) is generally accompanied by an increase in inter-
est rates. A decrease in the direct finance ratio (an increase in the
degree of institutional investment) is accompanied by a decline in
interest rates.23 When the sellers of tax-exempt obligations must
find a market for a bigger proportion among investors (the equiv-
alent of an increase in the Shaw-Gurley direct finance ratio), then
rates must be pushed up. Most of the benefits of tax exemption then
accrue, not to borrowers, but to investors.
23 John G. Gurley and Edward S. Shaw, "Financial Intermediaries and the
Saving-Investment Process," Journal of Finance, May 1956, Vol. xi, No. 2, pp.
257-76.
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